




















* Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Germany 
This research was supported by the Deutsche 





SFB 649, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 













































Trade-Off Between Consumption Growth and Inequality:
Theory and Evidence for Germany
Runli Xie∗
This draft: June, 2009
Abstract
This paper examines the structure and evolution of consumption and consumption
growth inequality. Once heterogeneous agents relate their neighbors’ consumption to
their own, consumption volatility and inequality are affected. The relationship predicted
between the group average consumption growth and within-group growth inequality was
shown as only slightly positive yet significant using survey data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel (GSOEP, 1984-2005). Age and household size are crucial for within-
group inequality, as young and/or small households are more sensitive to income and
consumption shocks. Large and well-educated households with unskilled jobs have shown
surprisingly inferior performance in consumption growth and variance. The data also
shows increases of within-group inequality directly after the reunification and the intro-
duction of the euro.
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1 Introduction
The structure and evolution of income inequality has always been well documented for many
countries, while studies on consumption inequality are relatively limited due to the availability
of survey data. This is also the case for Germany where most inequality studies focus on
wage income, disposable income or household wealth. For the purpose of examining the well-
being of population, however, consumption is a more direct measure. The contribution of
this paper is two-folded: providing a theoretical framework of heterogeneous agents in order
to examine the link between within-group inequality and group average consumption growth,
and finding empirical evidence on the aforementioned relationship using household data from
the German Socio-Economic Panel study.
Of the 24 sample households groups divided according to characteristics including house-
hold size, age, education and occupation of household head, Figure 1, 2 and 3 plot the group
average income and consumption growth. Two points are worth noticing concerning the
figures: firstly, the growth patterns are remarkable different across groups both in latitude
and frequency, where young, small households with high education and skilled job (group 4)
have the highest income and consumption growth, which stay almost always positive; sec-
ondly, more than often, consumption growth sinks deeper than income growth at bad time
and climbs higher than income growth at good time. It seems as if there are moments when
households over-adjust their consumption as reaction to income shocks. Although this does
not overthrow (DIAN FU) the business cycle stylized fact on consumption’s being less volatile
than income, it renders question on the rationality assumption of the households. Reasoning
can take various perspectives, one of which is the consumption externality discussed in this
paper.
The analysis of consumption inequality for Germany (West) in this paper complements a
number of studies that use micro data to document the evolution of income or wage inequality
in Germany in the last 25 years. As Biewen (2000) finds that the West German income
distribution between 1984 and 1996 was stable, Ludsteck and Schönberg (2007), exploring
the IABS 2% random sample of social security records for the years 1975 to 2004, conclude
that German wage inequality has increased at the top of the distribution in the 1980s, while
inequality at the bottom of the distribution started to rise in the 1990s. Apart from labor
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Figure 1: Consumption and Income Growth, Young
Figure 2: Consumption and Income Growth, Middle
2
Figure 3: Consumption and Income Growth, Old
income, recent studies lay more attention in capital income and regard it as another source of
inequality. Fräßdorf, Grabka and Schwarze (2008) compare Germany, the U.S. and the U.K.,
analyze the weight of capital income in disposable income, and find that a large part of the
growing disparity of disposable income could be explained by the increasing capital income
inequality.
As one of the first studies on the trend of consumption inequality in Germany, Fuchs-
Schündeln, Krüger and Sommer (2008) look into both income and consumption inequality.
Combining the GSOEP and EVS data, they document the inequality trends of wage income,
consumption and wealth in West Germany and find upward trends in wage and market
income after the reunification. In contrast, disposable income and consumption inequality
only display a modest rise over the same period. The pattern of consumption inequality
in their findings can be confirmed in this paper, and what’s more, by constructing yearly
consumption data from the GSOEP, my study fills in the blanks between their observations
based on EVS, which is only available every five years.
The theoretical part of this paper is rooted in a rich body of literature on the connection
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between income shocks and consumption growth inequality. Incomplete risk-sharing/imperfect
insurance are often considered as the explanations to the diverse evolution of income and con-
sumption inequality. Examining U.S. panel data on income from the PSID (1978-1992) and
cross-section Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) data on consumption (1980-1992), Blun-
dell, Pistaferri and Preston (2008) confirm that consumption inequality follows closely the
trends in permanent earnings inequality, as is shown earlier in Cutler and Katz (1991). They
also find extremely strong evidence against full insurance for permanent income shocks but
not for transitory income shocks, which is an extended result of a previous study by Blundell
and Preston (1998).
Krüger and Perri (2005) notice in the CEX data that while between-group consumption
inequality has tracked between-group income inequality quite closely, within-group consump-
tion inequality has increased much less than within-group income inequality. Motivated by
this observation, they propose a theoretical framework depicting the risk-sharing behavior
within groups when idiosyncratic labor income shocks occur, where the market is imperfect
due to the lack of contract enforceability. Their model shows that when income becomes
more volatile, risk-sharing turns out to be more valuable for agents. As their incentive to
default diminishes, within-group consumption inequality also decreases consequently. Par-
allel to limited enforcement of contracts, private information problem is another hypothesis
on consumption smoothing and risk-sharing. Attanasio and Pavoni (2007) present such a
setting, introducing moral hazard and hidden savings. Since agents in their model can insure
more of their idiosyncratic risks under asymmetric information on efforts and secretive sav-
ings, consumption volatility resulted is lower than in a single asset model (E.g. permanent
income hypothesis type of model, PIH).
In this paper I choose a comparatively easy way of modeling to capture the “excessive
smoothing” of consumption. In the spirit of Duesenberry’s Relative Income Hypothesis (1949)
and similar to the setup in Gaĺı (1994), I apply a special type of consumption externalities,
group average consumption, to a self insurance model. The attitude of households toward
this externality is the key issue if the model produces “excessive smoothing” or opposite.
Acknowledging consumption growth inequality as a result of income uncertainties (permanent
and transitory), I use this model to study the link between the group average consumption
growth and within-group inequality. The main theoretical finding is that this consumption
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externality drives agents from the original consumption smoothing path. When restrictions
on the time series properties of consumption growth are relaxed, the deviation can be even
larger. Nevertheless, regardless of the extent of the deviation, the model most possibly
predicts a positive correlation between the group average consumption growth and within-
group inequality.
I further test this theoretical hypothesis using data from the German Socio-Economic
Panel and find significant though only slightly positive correlation. Overall, the constructed
consumption data does not show large changes in inequality during the sample period (1984-
2005), except distinguishable increases directly after the reunification of Germany and the
introduction of the euro. Compared to income inequality, the data shows a similar picture as
what Krüger and Perri (2005) find in U.S. data, that between-group consumption inequal-
ity has tracked between-group income inequality much more closely than the within-group
consumption inequality has followed the within-group income inequality.
The rest of the paper is organized as following: Section Two presents the theoretical model
and an extension based on the random walk hypothesis of consumption growth; Section Three
introduces the GSOEP data and discusses inequality trends in Germany in the 22 sampling
years; in Section Four the grouping strategy of the sample is discussed, and tests are carried
out on the relationship between consumption growth and inequality; Section Five concludes.
2 Consumption Growth and Inequality
In modern economics there are two major hypothesis connecting income shocks and consump-
tion insurance. The complete market hypothesis assumes that consumption is fully insured
against idiosyncratic income shocks (both permanent and transitory), which is soundly re-
jected in micro data (e.g. Attanasio and Davis, 1996). The other one, the permanent income
hypothesis, assumes that personal savings serve as the only mechanism to smooth income
shocks, and exclusively against transitory shocks (Deaton, 1992). This hypothesis is also
rejected by, for example, Attanasio and Pavoni (2007). Their paper, as well as an earlier
paper by Campbell and Deaton (1989), finds that consumption exhibits “excessive smooth-
ness” by reacting too little to permanent income shocks; while some other studies find that
consumption shows “excessive sensitivity” by reacting too much to transitory shocks (e.g.
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Hall and Mishkin, 1982). The truth seems to lie somewhere in between, and therefore partial
insurance of consumption to income shocks becomes slowly the consensus.
Based these works and acknowledging the effects of income shocks on consumption insur-
ance, various extensions were added to the simple self insurance (PIH) model in asset pricing
literature and one special “flavor” is to include relative consumption into household utility as
a consumption externality . There is a refined difference if agents take the previous or current
average consumption as benchmark. The former, which is a variation of the habit formation
setup, is the case of “catching up with the Joneses” (Mehra and Prescott, 1985, Abel, 1990,
Campbell and Cochrane, 1999) and the latter “keeping up with the Joneses”(Gaĺı, 1994).
While the former involves the interdependence between the agents’ past, present and future
well-being, the latter setup emphasizes contemporaneous trade-offs and generates simpler
result. In fact, Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) discusses optimal tax policy using these two
differentiated cases and finds as optimal procyclical taxes for the former and a flat tax rate
for the latter1.
The true task of this paper is to study the contemporaneous consumption distribution
(cross-sectional) using a panel setting, and therefore the “keeping up with the Joneses” model
is chosen so as to avoid more complex intertemporal considerations. To be specific, the model
should help to discover the connection between consumption growth and inequality.
The paper starts with discussing two possible extensions of a standard PIH model where
agents use one asset to transfer resources intertemporally. The first extension involves some
external criteria for the households: the households cast their preference not only on their
own consumption, but also on that of their neighbors (other households who are in the
same social class). Relative standard of living becomes another important issue besides the
absolute level. The consumption smoothing path of the household in the standard PIH model
would be distorted, and variance of consumption would change. The direction of this change
depends on household attitude to their neighbors’ well-being (if they are altruistic or meant
to “keep up with the Joneses”). The result, however, is reached regardless of the assumption
about the time series properties of the group average growth (the cross sectional moments
such as means and variances), and the relaxation of this assumption will be examined as the
1Guo (2003) elaborates the latter case by adding capital accumulation and imperfect competition in the
goods market and finds similar result
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second extension.
2.1 A Heterogeneous Agent Model
The economy is composed of a large number of heterogeneous households, which can be
divided into m groups according to characteristics such as household size, members’ age,
education, occupation and so on. One can intuitively interpret a group as a highly similar
neighborhood. Households within one group share the aforementioned features but are still
subject to idiosyncratic income and consumption shocks. Although households in a given
group do not observe the exact income of other group members, they can observe their
consumption patterns. If they would like to compare with others in a similar socio-economic
class, it is the case of “keeping up with the Joneses”. Otherwise, if they also benefit when
others are doing well, we have “altruistic” households. I label the result of this additional
externality a group effect on household consumption decision.
The setup is similar to Gaĺı(1994) and Abel (1990), only that in Abel’s case households
regard agents’ own consumption habits and the group average consumption in the previ-
ous period as a benchmark for their current period consumption (“catching up with the
Joneses”)2. Besides, Gaĺı(1994) and Abel (1990) both use the model to describe the (homo-
geneous) households in the whole economy, while this paper rather takes the perspective of
each group, and the “keeping up” mechanism bounds the agents within one group only. The
comparison of agents in different groups is not captured in this model, which does not deny
the existence of such comparison, but is rather the result of model simplification and focus
on the more likely comparison among people of similar socio-economic backgrounds.
There are two reasons why a heterogeneous agent model is considered here. Firstly, just
as is shown in Figure 1, 2 and 3, aging effect on consumption growth can vary for peo-
ple with different education/occupation attainments. Secondly, using heterogeneous agents
model enables the contemporaneous examination of consumption growth inequality within
group, while still allowing for comparison on time dimension and/or group-to-group dimen-
2Abel (1990) introduces jointly the agent’s own consumption habit and past aggregate consumption into
current utility: u (Ct, vt) = [Ct/vt]







D = 0, then the current consumption only takes external habit (aggregate consumption) as benchmark, which
is also the case here.
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sion (more discussion of this issue can be found at the end of next subsection). In a word, such
setup allows mobility of the households on the total consumption distribution and enables
their comparison with their contemporaneous benchmarks once they move from one group
to another.
Households transfer their resources between periods by buying and selling a risk-free one-
period bond which pays off one unit of consumption good. Let {qt}∞t=0 be the sequence of
bond prices and {Aij,t+1}∞t=0 the plan of asset holdings. A typical PIH model also allows
for endogenous labor supply and non-stationary income (Bewley, 1977). However, since the
purpose of this paper is on the consumption dynamics, I reduce the household problem to
consumption and asset holding decisions. To rule out other possible deterrents to consumption
smoothing, I also assume there are no liquidity constraint for any household even though
previous empirical tests have shown such constraint may be an important explanation for
excessive sensitivity of consumption to current income (Flavin, 1984)3. Another simplification
is not to emphasize the mobility of the households across the groups. The reason is two-fold.
On the on hand, the purpose of using panel data is to examine the consumption growth, which
requires the involvement of sequential years but underlines the cross-sectional comparison.
One the other hand, the data shows that mobility is an important but not the dominant
issue, since more than half of the households in the samples (56.8%) between 1984-2005 have
never changed their groups, while among the group swtichers over half of them (51.8%) have
changed only once, among which over 52.7% cases happened due to aging. In a word, these
heterogeneous households appeared to stay relatively persistently in their group.
Define Cij,t as the time t household consumption of the jth household in the ith group,
Xi,t the group-average consumption and Yij,t the endowment realization at the same period.
γ is the risk aversion parameter and is usually larger than 1. Household j in group i has the
3In fact Flavin (1984) examines a simple “Keynesian” consumption function as an alternative to the PIH.
Using unemployment rate as proxy for the portion of population subject to liquidity constraint, she confirms
the excess sensitivity of consumption to current income (i.e. behavior marginal propensity to consume out of





















where A0 is given and limT→∞ qTAij,T = 0 so that Ponzi schemes are ruled out.
The utility function has the following isoelastic form:






As is mentioned above, the model is simplified to exclude mobility of households and com-
parison with non-group members. The consumption part of the utility can be approximately
decomposed into two parts taking logarithms:
(1− γ) lnCij,t − (1− γ)α lnXi,t = (1− γ)
[





Scaled by parameter α, household’s consumption preference is a weighted average of the
absolute and relative consumption (compared to group average). There is no restriction on
α to be positive or negative, which allows us to examine three cases considering the group
effect in consumption:
1. When α > 0, the household would like to “keep up with the Joneses”. Average
consumption decreases the household’s utility level but increases household’s marginal utility
of an additional unit of consumption. This reflects exactly the economic implication of
“keeping up with the Joneses”, since “any given addition to his current level of consumption
becomes more valuable”5. In the later part of the paper, it will become clear that such partial








Labor income is considered as the product of an economy-wide wage and idiosyncratic labor endowment,
and the latter consists of a group-specific part (explainable by group characteristics) and an unexplained part
(which includes a permanent and a transitory part).
5Gaĺı(1994).
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preferences, keeping up with the Joneses, could reduce contemporaneous consumption growth
inequality but drive up the consumption volatility over business cycle further from a model
without consumption externality.
2. When α < 0, households do not take the group mean as benchmark, but rather
gain utility once the others in the group are doing well. For philanthropists this could
be interpreted as altruism. However, a more economic intuition is that the group mean
consumption acts as “substitute” for the household’s own consumption. This would be the
feature of a public good. Here, a single household benefits from an increase in the group
average.
3. When α = 0, the utility function is reduced to a typical self insurance version, where
agents are only concerned with their own consumption.









2.2 Implication on Consumption Dynamics
Even though household income does not enter the model directly, it is closely related to
household consumption. The permanent income hypothesis states that periodical consump-
tion is subject to lifetime resources, instead of each period’s income. Household wealth is
thus a better candidate as a consumption constraint. However, while the change of household
consumption is additionally triggered by consumption innovations, the main shocks occur-
ring to household consumption are often identified as contemporaneous income shocks in the
related literature.
Following Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), I assume that per period labor income Yij,t follows
the following process:
yij,t+1 = lnYij,t = ϕZij,t + Pij,t +$ij,t
6In Abel’s (1990) model households compare themselves with the previous consumption of the group











Taking logs gives the same result as above, since the growth rate of Xi,t is time invariant. This picture,
however, can be totally different if consumption growth is time-variant.
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where Zij,t is a set of observable characteristics, Pij,t is the permanent income component,
and $ij,t is the transitory component.7
The permanent component of income follows a martingale process (random walk):
Pij,t+1 = Pij,t + ζij,t+1
where ζij,t is the permanent shock and serially uncorrelated.
The log of income growth is therefore
4yij,t+1 = yij,t+1 − yij,t = ϕ4Zij,t+1 + (ζij,t+1 +4$ij,t+1) .
Once data are available on income and consumption, one can even identify the degrees
to which permanent and transitory income shocks affect the change of consumption (see
Blundell et al., 2008). Even though this is not the focus of my paper, it serves as the premise
of my approach. Based on the strong correlation between consumption and income, a natural
guess is that the change in log consumption is subject to part of the permanent income shock,
transitory income shocks and consumption innovation shocks. The consumption growth rate
of household j in group i is approximately the difference of log consumption and can be
decomposed into gi,t+1, the average growth rate of group i, and some household specific
shock vij,t+1:






gij,t, j = 1, 2, ..., Ji




As is mentioned, this unexplained consumption growth shock vij,t+1 contains information
about income shocks (permanent and transitory), as well as some household specific consump-
tion innovation (Blundell et al. 2008). The interaction of between-households comparison is
captured in the group aggregate growth. In the most simple case, where the growth of con-
sumption is assumed to be log-normally distributed, I can assume gi,t+1 to be time-invariant
(gi).
7Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) use U.S. data to test the autocovariance of the unexplained earnings growth
rate. Their result suggests that the transitory shock follows a moving average of degree 1.
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I aggregate the households within each group i, the idiosyncratic shocks average out and
4xi,t+1 = xi,t+1 − xi,t = gi,t+1
Apparently, Xi,t is also log-normally distributed, and has a rather simple distribution
N (gi, 0)8. Therefore the one-period bond price is
qt = β exp
[





A none-zero α leads to the deviation from the standard PIH case where the household
optimization problem is independent of others’ consumption behavior. This deviation could
be one way to mitigate the equity premium puzzle problem in asset pricing. To focus on
growth and inequality, I take logs and rearrange equation (2) as:
σ2vi = 2
[γ + α (1− γ)] gi + ln qt − lnβ
γ2
(3)
It yields a relationship between the within-group variance in consumption growth and
group average consumption growth. Note that once no group mean is taken into account by
the household (α = 0), the equation is reduced to the standard PIH model:
σ2vi = 2
γgi + ln qt − lnβ
γ2
. (4)
Comparing these two equations can tell us the effect of minding neighbors’ “business”.
For a reasonable value of risk aversion, 1− γ < 0,
Proposition 1 household altruism / enviousness leads to a higher / lower within-group
inequality in consumption growth comparing to a no-externality model.













[(γ − 1)α− γ] gi, γ2σ2vi
)















and plug it into the FOC.
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When households are enthusiastic about group average well-being (regarding it as a public
good) and lack the incentive to keep up, the variance of the unexplained part of the con-
sumption growth σ2vi , as well as consumption itself, is higher than in a typical PIH model.
Following the contrary argument, group inequality is lower in the case of keeping up with
the Joneses. Intuitively, members’ endeavor to keep up with each other naturally leads to the
declining group variance in each single period. Now recall the modeling strategy to exclude
mobility of the households across groups, one can see that this result rather offers a snapshot
of within-group variance and makes cross-sectional comparison possible, thus regardless of
the mobility question.
Apart from this contemporaneous effect, two further interpretations can be made from
the result. Firstly there is a story on the evolution of inequality over time.
Proposition 2 In the “keeping-up” / altruism scenario, business cycle effects are rein-
forced and aggregate consumption turns to be more / less volatile over the time than in a
classical PIH model.
Let’s focus on the “keeping-up” case. In a business cycle context, in boom times agents
would sell more bonds than they would in an externality-free economy so as to keep up
with the average high consumption level, while in recessions everyone’s comparison with the
prudent neighbors leads to higher consumption contraction. In a word, business cycle effects
are reinforced and aggregate consumption thus turns to be more volatile over the time than
in no-externality case.
Moreover, the faster the others in your group are upgrading, the larger is the punishment
of not keeping up with them.
Proposition 3 The variance moderating effect under “keeping-up” is stronger in booms
(when growth rate gi is high) than in recessions (with a lower growth rate).
Alternatively the result can be used to interpret the difference in group-specific inequality
between groups. The major concern is on the sign of the relationship between gi and σ2vi ,
which depends on the degree of risk-aversion and the sign and size of the externality parame-
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ter α. For example, a positive correlation would suggest that groups with higher consumption
growth also have to pay the price of larger within-group inequality. Nonetheless, equation
(3) shows that there is a possibility that the relation becomes negative: group with higher
consumption growth is subject to lower within-group disparity.
Proposition 4 Given a reasonable value of risk aversion parameter (γ > 1), negative
relationship between group average consumption growth and within-group inequality occurs
when agents have high desire in “keeping up with the Joneses” (α > γγ−1 > 1).
Other than assuming the values of the key parameters, it is also possible to estimate
them using the method of maximum likelihood (MLE), which will be in the next step of the
research. The focus of the current paper is to examine the empirical relationship between
group average consumption growth and within-group inequality.
2.3 The Time Series Properties to Group Consumption Growth Rate
A further extension of the model includes relaxing the time-invariance assumption about the
group average consumption growth. Note that the theoretical result (3) does not depend on
if group-specific consumption growth is time-invariant or not. However, asset pricing theory
tells that the assumption about the evolution of consumption growth rate is very important
for the theoretical model to reproduce the price volatilities of the risk-free bonds.
Starting from the consumption level itself, there has been an intense debate on if it is a
random walk process. Hall’s famous random walk hypothesis was challenged by Campbell and
Mankiw (1989), who use aggregate data and test the predictability of consumption change
from income change. Their result shows that about fifty percent of the change in consumption
is predictable, implying a significant rejection to the random walk hypothesis. Will this also
hold for the GSOEP data? A small exercise is carried out on the 24 groups defined by
characteristics including household size, household head’s age, education and occupation.
After the optimal lags of the group average per capita consumptions are found through
Augmented Dickey-Fuller / Generalized Least Squares unit root test, a confirmatory analysis
jointly using Dickey-Fuller test, Phillips-Perron test and a stationarity KPSS test is applied
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to detect the stationarity of the group average consumption level9. The result, however, is
not at all obvious: 2 out of 24 groups appear to follow a stationary process, also 2 out of 24
groups significantly show nonstationary pattern, while the rest unclear in their stationarity.
When trend is assumed, 3 groups’ consumption appear to be stationary and 3 other groups
non-stationary, and the rest 18 groups bear unclear results.
Following the same procedure, I run the tests for the group-specific consumption growth.
The results here are much more clear compared to those for consumption level. Indeed at
the 5% significance level, when time trend is assumed, 19 out of 24 groups appear to be
stationary processes; when no trend is included, all 24 groups’ consumption growth can’t
reject the hypothesis of stationarity.
Based on this observation, I assume that the group-wide growth rate gi,t+1 of consumption
follows a driftless AR(1) process with a group-specific shock ui,t+1:





which implies that consumption growth is conditionally log-normally distributed:
Et [gi,t+1] = φgi,t and vart [gi,t+1] = σ2u
The variance of this group-specific shock can be interpreted as one of the sources of
between-group variance. Recall from (1) that the difference between individual consumption
growth and the group mean is merely the idiosyncratic shock vij,t. Combining (5) with (1)
yields gij,t+1 = φgi,t + ui,t+1 + vij,t+1, where the conditional mean and variance are
Et [gij,t+1] = φgi,t and vart [gij,t+1] = σ2u + σ
2
vi .






. Equation (2) would look dif-
ferent:
qt = β exp
[(γ − 1)α− γ]φgi,t + γ2σ2vi +
[





Obviously, the additional uncertainty from group consumption growth drives up household
demand for a secure transfer of their consumption between periods, thus increasing the bond
9This confirmatory analysis is used because both Dickey-Fuller test and Phillips-Perron test have low power
in rejecting the null hypothesis of unit root, and therefore an opposite test for stationarity, which also has the
low rejecting power problem, is used for comparison.
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price. Besides, when current growth gi,t is high, households expect high consumption growth
tomorrow. Due to their smoothing motive, they would like to borrow against future growth,
thus also driving up bond prices.
The stationary consumption growth also adds a new element to consumption inequality:
σ2vi =








Keeping all other parts unchanged, within-group inequality decreases as a large part of
the variance is now attributed to the between-group differences.
However, the correlation between the group growth rate and within-group variance is the
same as in (3).
As mentioned above, except that households are highly altruistic and risk averse, both
the standard PIH case and the extensions would predict a positive correlation between the
group growth and within-group variance. It suggests that groups with faster consumption
growth have also higher variance in growth. Should they be groups with a lower consumption
level and therefore especially sensitive to income shocks? Since a larger part of their income
may be used to purchase basic goods with a very low demand elasticity, and a relatively small
portion of the consumption is sensitive to the business cycle (luxury goods) compared to the
higher income group, it may be the higher endowment group who bears more consumption
growth inequality and has faster consumption growth. This hypothesis may be tested using
the GSOEP data set where annual household consumption can be constructed in subsequent
years between 1995 and 2005. The next section will describe the data and report the results.
3 Bringing the Model to the Data
3.1 GSOEP
For the purpose of testing this theoretical framework, panel data is needed to get the growth
rate of household consumption, whereas the best choice is the German Socio-Economic
Panel10. Starting from 1984, this panel data set is based on household interviews, and
10Alternatively, the micro data from German Income and Expenditure Survey (Einkommens- und Ver-
brauchsstichprobe, EVS) can offer a deep and detailed view of the household consumption. However it is
carried out only every 5 years, which, unfortunately, can not help constructing the growth rates
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contains crucial questions on living and income. The sample used in this paper includes all
West German and foreigner households from 1984, whereas immigrants households are added
starting in 1995. However, since GSOEP does not offer much information on consumption,
especially not on nondurable goods consumption, what one can do is to construct consump-
tion from the available information on financial inflows and outflows. Besides the household
monthly net income and savings, there are data on extra income: yearly rental income,
capital/investment income, additional income from winnings and inheritance; and detailed
expenditures: rent without heating costs, water and other expenses (noted as CR from here
on), the cost of heating and water, the credit and interest repayment. Unfortunately, there are
neither data on expenditure on durable goods (which would otherwise decrease the amount
of nondurable consumption), nor data on total amount of consumption credit (which would
otherwise increase the total amount of the expenditure). I can only make the assumption that
the two missing parts of the puzzle, the underestimation and overestimation, approximately
cancel each other out, i.e. consumption credit is only used for durable goods. This, however,
is a reasonable assumption due to the often high prices of the durables.
I follow Cutler and Katz (1991) to construct consumption from the expenditure of house
owners, where I need to impute the market-valued cold rent for all house owners. In case
some house owners also report their own estimation of the rental value of the housing, I also
impute the estimated CR for other house owners who did not report their estimation. The
imputations are based on relevant house characteristics such as size of the apartment, family
size, family monthly net income, area of the apartment (only available in 1985, 1994, 1999,
2004). Year and federal state dummies are included11. Then I add the imputed CR/estimated
CR to expenditure and deduct the mortgage payments and interest, the expenses to maintain
the house, as well as the costs for water, garbage removal and street cleaning, in order to get
an approximation of consumption for these house owners. Further I calculate consumption
growth of each household. Regressions of within-group variances on the group average growth
rate, using these two imputed values separately, yield slightly different results (see Figure 4
and 6).
11The two imputed results are highly correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.915, which indicates that
the estimated CR by the house owner does not differ too much from the market value. In 62.4% of the cases,
the estimated rent is higher than the market value of the apartment/house.
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3.2 Grouping Strategy
Before entering the discussion about within-group and between-group effects, the crucial
question would be, what criteria can be used to group the samples. For this purpose I
carry out a two-step strategy to identify the criteria. Firstly, a factor analysis with principle
component is used to distill the various household characteristics into most informative ones.
With variables such as nationality, sex and federal land discarded, three blocks of variables are
retained: age of household head and partner, their education level and their job types. Some
variables overlap with each other, such as International Standard Classification of Education
(ISCED-1997) and years of education, or Erikson Goldthorpe Classification (EGP) for job
types and Occupational Position (Stellung im Beruf, coded by Statistisches Bundesamt).
Therefore I run a simple OLS regression of log consumption on combinations of the crucial
household characteristics mentioned above together with household size and year dummies,
and look for the combination with the highest explanatory power. Since a Breusch-Pagan test
shows that the residuals are heteroskedastic, I allow for heteroskedasticity in the regression.
My result shows that in this dataset the best explanatory variables for consumption are
age and age-squared, ISCED for education 12, EGP for occupation 13 of the household head,
household size and its square, as well as the interaction term of education and occupation.
Year dummies are included. As the fitted part counts for the between-group variance, the
residuals (unexplained variables) are equivalent to the within-group inequality, and thus the
data carries the information of the evolution of these inequalities over the sampling years. A
further discussion of this important byproduct can be found in next subsection.
Having extracted the most relevant attributes, I can start grouping the samples. Con-
sequently, I use household size and household head’s age, ISCED education level and EGP
occupation to divide the sample into 24 groups. Particularly, a household is regarded as small
once there are fewer than 3 members, otherwise it is large. Regarding age, suppose on average
12Dividing levels of education into: Pre-Primary Education, Primary Education or First Stage of Basic
Education, Lower Secondary or Secondary Stage of Basic Education, (Upper) Secondary Education, Post-
Secondary Non-Tertiary Education, First Stage of Tertiary Education, and Second Stage of Tertiary Education.
13Dividing occupations into: High Service, Low Service, Routine Non Manual, Self-Employed With Employ-
ees, Self-Employed No Employees, Manual Supervise, Skilled Manual, Semi - Unskilled Manual, Farm Labor,
Self-Employed Farm, Unemployed, and Pensioner.
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one person can work 40 years (between 25 and 65 years old), then the first 10 years (25-35)
would be the phase of trying out and getting stabilized, and the last 10 years is the adjusting
period before retirement, and the middle 20 years is the most stable period in the sense of
income and social status. Therefore I consider the household head to be young if she or he is
under 35, middle aged if between 35 and 55, and old if older than 55. For education levels,
a household is counted as higher educated if one has at least post-secondary non-tertiary
education, or lower educated otherwise. At last, I use the EGP to label the job as of higher
level if the index is less or equal to 8 (including high/low level service, routine non-manual,
self-employed, manual supervision, and skilled manual jobs), otherwise it is considered as
lower level.
3.3 An Important By-Product: the Evolution of Inequalities
Figure 4: Consumption Inequality I
Figure 4 shows the evolution of total, between-group and within-group inequality. We
can observe a notable increase in total inequality directly after the reunification in the year
1990. A closer look at the decomposed inequality (Figure 5) reveals that this rise was fueled
by a 42.3% surge of within-group variance (emphasized by a shaded column). This may be a
result of the influx of East German workers to West Germany. This is not a period when a
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Figure 5: Consumption Inequality I (A Closer Look)
Figure 6: Consumption Inequality II (A Closer Look)
20
trained doctor from the East could immediately get a job with the same payment as his West
German colleague. Another time point of sharp increase in inequality comes in 2000 when the
euro was introduced, and ascended further when Germany experienced a boom (2002/2003).
High inflation followed the arrival of the new currency and joined the upturn of the economy,
which may have distorted people’s usual consumption behavior. To be observed at first is an
increase of within-group variance, which is more “nominal” and may result from differences in
heterogeneous preferences and idiosyncratic shocks. Afterwards, the real economy may also
be affected and the structure of economic sectors and industries could potentially change,
which may consequently raise the inequality between different groups.
Figure 6 shows a slightly different version of the evolution of inequality. Instead of im-
puted CR, the imputed estimation of cold rent is added to expenditure (and effectively to
consumption). While the total and between-group variances do not change much, the within-
group variance is higher in absolute value. Accordingly, in most of the years, within-group
variance, which peaked in 1991 and 2003, overtakes between-group variance. This is a result
from the overestimation of CR compared to the market value of the rent. The imputed ex-
penses in consumption of house owners are thus higher, and so is the difference between them
and the renters. Subsequently, consumption inequality within the same group increases, and
the increase after the reunification is even more impressive.
Additionally, Figure 7 compares the inequality of income and consumption (calculated
with the imputed CR) within groups and between groups. W Income represents the within-
group income inequality, W Consumption the within-group consumption inequality, B Income
the between-group income inequality, and B Consumption the between-group consumption
inequality. Similar to what is found by Krüger and Perri (2005) for U.S., between-group
consumption inequality has tracked between-group income inequality more closely, while
within-group consumption inequality has increased less than within-group income inequality.
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Figure 7: Consumption Inequality II
4 Empirical Test for Correlation
4.1 Is Inequality the Price for Growth?
Although I try to include all legitimate explanatory variables, it may still happen that some
important candidates are not available in the data set. In fact an omitted-variable test sug-
gests that the model does have omitted variables. Therefore the regression residual includes
both the within-group variances and the error term εi,t due to the lack of regressors.
gij,t = α4Zij,t+1 + vij,t + εi,t (6)
As the changes in group-specific characteristics are usually very limited across years,
4Zij,t+1 is close to zero. Averaging (6) over all j within each group i produces the group
average growth rate, which is approximately equal to the measurement error εi,t.
As a result, a better estimation for the within-group variance is the demeaned group rate





The following table shows the OLS regression result of the group variance on average group
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growth and year dummies. Heteroskedasticity of the error terms is controlled for. At the
0.1% significance level, the regression coefficient of the group average growth rate is slightly
positive (0.066) when the imputed CR is used, whereas if I use imputed estimation of CR the
coefficient increases to 0.315 with a t-value of 13.47. This result points to a positive direction
of the relationship, i.e., higher consumption growth is possibly accompanied by higher within-
group consumption growth inequality. Admittedly this relation is relatively weak and one can
not use it as a clear-cut evidence for the hypothesis posted at the equilibrium of theoretical
model. It thus makes more sense to look into details of the groups.
The data shows the groups with highest consumption growth are young, small sized
households with good education and skilled jobs (see later Figure 11), while the highest
growth inequality appears in the group of young, small sized households with low education
and unskilled jobs (see later Figure 20). It seems that young groups have at the meantime
high growth and high equality. One possible reason can be that a large portion of the young
population is still studying or under training, with very limited income. Besides, even among
those who are working, people are subject to more shocks and changes at the beginning of
their career, particularly due to different educational backgrounds and job types, which could
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also contribute to the high inequality within young population. A further deduction is, as
they grow older, working experience can make up for the lack of education and the differences
in income and consumption growth between the group members should decrease.
Figure 8: Per Capita Consumption Gap-Young v.s. Old
The data provides evidence in line with these arguments, which shows that the remarkable
difference within each age group. Let’s take a first look at the consumption gap, which is
defined as the difference in per capita consumption of two totally different groups: large
households with high education and skilled jobs versus small households with low education
and unskilled jobs. Figure 8 plots the gaps for young-, middle- and old-aged households. One
can see that the gaps are distinct for various age groups, with the largest gap almost always
in the elderly households (except between 1997-1999). At the beginning of the sample period,
the gap is relatively small for the young and big for the old population until the end 1980s.
Within this starting period, the smallest gap occurred in 1987 for the young households,
which is about 31.5%; the largest gap was among the old households and hits as high as 86.7
percentage points. In the first half of 1990s, the gap in old households keeps high, whereas
between 1994-1996 the gap in the young surpasses that for the middle-aged. Since the end
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Figure 9: Per Capita Consumption Growth Gap-Young v.s. Old
of 1990s the gaps have converged with an exceptionally low point for old in 2003, reaching
47.2%.
The consumption growth also differs within different age groups, as is shown in Figure 9,
with some similar trend between the young and old households from 1995 to 1999. Apart from
the fact that the gaps in three age groups alternate in dominating the consumption growth
during the whole sample period, it is also interesting to see that the gaps in consumption
growth stay most time positive (a few exceptional negative points include: 1985-1987, 1990,
1991, 2002 and 2004 for gap in the young households; 1987, 1989, 1994, 2000 and 2003 for
gap in the middle-aged households, 1991, 1995, 1999 and 2003 for gap in the old households).
Recall in Figure 8 the absolute positiveness in the consumption gaps between these groups
with different educational and occupational backgrounds. This result indicates that for each
age group, the superior groups (groups with better education and jobs) not only have absolute
advantage in consumption, but also undergo averagely higher consumption growth. As a
result, we can observe in Figure 8 a slightly upward trend in the absolute consumption gaps.
The consumption gaps above capture the difference between the most and least advan-
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Figure 10: Per Capita Consumption-Large Households
Figure 11: Per Capita Consumption-Small Households
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Figure 12: Consumption Ratio-Large Households
Figure 13: Consumption Ratio-Small Households
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taged groups, and the per capita consumption for each group are shown in Figure 10 and 11,
where household head’s age is controlled. It appears that average consumption in the house-
holds increases with household head’s age, and per capita consumption of the old households
almost always appears to be the highest, which is followed by middle-aged households. This
ranking of consumption almost always holds, should households be large or small. Besides,
old household consumption is also most stable over time, especially in the small household
case.
Not only do households with elderly head have the highest absolute consumption, they also
have the highest consumption ratio out of the total income (Figure 12 and 13). The ordering
of the consumption ratio in different age groups is similar to that of absolute consumption,
implying that the older the household head is, the higher consumption ratio the household
has. Since we do not observe an obvious decline of household total income through aging,
this high consumption ratio is more possibly attributed to the life-cycle effect, i.e. the elderly
agents do not save so much as the younger ones for their future. Meanwhile, if the high
consumption ratio corresponds to a high marginal propensity to consume, it may further
imply that old households do not hold the highest level of wealth among all population.
Moreover, the consumption ratios experience a rather obvious downward sloping trend
for each group. While such trend is not observed in the absolute per capita consumption
in the previous Figure 10 and 11, it suggests a faster growth of total income compared to
consumption and even an increasing living standard according to a broader interpretation of
Engel’s Law.
Groups with high consumption and high consumption ratio should also have high total
income. This is shown in Figure 14, 15 and 16, which plot the net income, total income and
consumption. Group 4 and 8, 12 and 16, 20 and 24 High educated and skilled households have
the highest income and consumption levels in their respective age periods, and households
in these groups share a common feature: they have high education and skilled jobs. We can
also observe that the dotted lines are sometimes overtaken by the solid lines, showing that
net income is sometimes not enough to cover the household consumption.
Do groups with high consumption level also have fast consumption growth? Or is it
rather opposite that poor households experience high growth? Recall Figure 1, 2 and 3 in
the introduction, which represent the young, middle-aged and old categories respectively and
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Figure 14: Per Capita Consumption and Income Level, Young
Figure 15: Per Capita Consumption and Income Level, Middle
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Figure 16: Per Capita Consumption and Income Level, Old
contain the group average consumption and income growth. There, only group 4, consisting of
young, small households with high education and skilled job, has an obviously higher growth
than others. Groups with particularly poor performance are 7, 15 and 23, which, different in
age, are large and well-educated households but with unskilled jobs. In fact most of the years
these groups only have negative income and consumption growth, which could be a result
of the unfortunate labour market mismatch of skills and jobs. Moreover, young households
in Figure 1 appear to have higher fluctuation than older ones in income and consumption
growth, regardless of other household features; middle-aged households in Figure 2 have the
least volatile consumption growth, only with group 11 (small and well-educated but with
unskilled jobs) as an exception.
Obviously the age of household head has very strong explanatory power for household
consumption behavior. controlling for the household size, Figure 17 and 18 address the is-
sue of age directly in plotting the per capita consumption growth for households in different
ages. The figures show, unless they are small and have skilled jobs, young households do
not necessarily have higher consumption growth than their older counterparts. As is men-
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Figure 17: Per Capita Consumption Growth-Large Households
Figure 18: Per Capita Consumption Growth-Small Households
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tioned before, for a well educated person, finishing study and finding a skilled job in the
labour market change his/her income level and consequently consumption pattern dramat-
ically, especially before the establishment of large family. Therefore we do not observe this
consumption growth difference due to age in the groups of large households.
It is also confirmed that well-educated households with unskilled jobs have an inferior
position, in the sense that their consumption growth are both irregular and often negative.
In comparison, less educated households with unskilled jobs are even lower in consumption
level (Figure 10 and 11); however, they have a rather smooth consumption growth, especially
if they are large households.
Until now, the discussion has focused on the consumption level and growth. The in-
tratemporal equilibrium of the model suggests a link between the consumption growth and
consumption variance, with the latter shown in Figure 19 and 20. For the purpose of compar-
ison, these two figures also look into large and small households respectively, where different
age groups are shown for each combination of education and skills.
In the case of small households (Figure 20), consumption growth inequality is extremely
and constantly high young households with low education and unskilled jobs (dotted line).
It seems that experience for the unskilled (which grows with age) is important in stabilizing
their consumption growth and bringing down the growth inequality. For the less educated
households with skilled jobs, age does not show a noticeable influence on the inequality
and we can observe a relative convergent pattern of the young, middle and old groups. In
the large households (Figure 19) what is prominent is the almost constant inequality of low
educated and unskilled workers, regardless of their age groups. Well-educated households with
unskilled jobs are again at inferior position with relatively high variance. In all, among large
households (except low-educated with unskilled jobs), the old ones seem to have experienced
high fluctuations in inequality in the past 20 years.
Another observation in Figure 21 is the effect of household size. For young and middle-
aged groups, small households have a higher within-group inequality in consumption growth,
but have a lower inequality in the old groups. It also becomes clear to draw a picture of the
old households (four graphics in the last row): unless they have low education with unskilled
jobs, old households have relatively high consumption growth inequality. The reasoning may
relate to the capital income effect on consumption.
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Figure 19: Variance of Per Capita Consumption-Large Households
Figure 20: Variance of Per Capita Consumption-Small Households
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Figure 21: Variance of Per Capita Consumption-Small v.s. Large
5 Summary
This paper offers an overview of consumption and consumption growth inequality in Germany
between 1984-2005. A theoretical model borrowed from the asset pricing literature is used
to examine the relationship between consumption growth and inequality.
Both complete market hypothesis and self insurance hypothesis are rejected in micro data.
To get around this problem, the literature suggests settings of unenforceable contracts and
private information. Alternatively, I adopt a simple extension from a typical PIH model,
which, among other traits, can generate “excessive smoothness”. I use it to examine the
dynamics of consumption inequality. The basic idea is that even though households can not
observe the income of other families with similar socio-economic status, they can observe the
living standards and consumptions of others. How they evaluate others’ consumptions affects
the group consumption growth inequality. In particular, if they want to keep themselves in
pace with their neighbors in consumption, consumption distribution within the group becomes
less dispersed than in a typical PIH model; while when they enjoy the well-being of others,
34
this “altruism” renders higher variances in consumption.
Concerning the time series properties of the group consumption growth rates, a test using
the German Socio-Economic Panel suggests stationarity for the consumption growth whereas
the deviation from the original consumption smoothing is even stronger. But however far the
deviation is, the model would always predict a positive relationship between the group average
growth rate and within-group variance given reasonable parameter values; i.e., the group with
higher consumption growth should also observe higher inequality within the group. This
theoretical result is tested using GSOEP survey data, where I divide the sample households
into 24 groups according to household characteristics such as size, age, education, occupation
of household head and so on.
The regression results shows a significant though only slightly positive relationship be-
tween group average consumption growth is and within-group consumption inequality. Fur-
thermore, under my grouping strategy, age and household size are undoubtedly crucial for
growth and variance. Since a large part of the young population is still out of the labor force
and has limited income, consumption differences between them and young professionals are
big. However, once they start working, the sudden relaxation of their financial constraint
boosts up their consumption to such a degree that the consumption growth of the young
groups is higher than the growth of the older groups.
In the sense of risk sharing, smaller households are more vulnerable to economic shocks.
After economies of scale is ruled out and per capita consumption is examined, small house-
holds dominate the large ones, especially for young and middle-aged households. The data
also shows that the otherwise relatively stable consumption growth inequality and within-
group inequality in particular undergo increases immediately after the reunification of Ger-
many and the introduction of the euro.
The study confirms the better income and consumption position of households with higher
education and skilled jobs. Moreover, a rather surprising result is who is at the inferior posi-
tion in the across group comparison. Taking consumption growth and variances as criteria,
the group with the worst performance are not those with low education and unskilled jobs, but
rather the large and well-educated households who unfortunately possess unskilled jobs. It
seems as if the mismatch in the labour market contributes to forming a twisted consumption
pattern of the households.
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These results offer an overall picture of consumption inequality in Germany in the last
20 years. Furthermore, business cycle effects are most likely also important for examining
consumption inequality. Is within-group inequality generally procyclical, countercyclical or
acyclical? Which groups are especially sensitive to booms and/or recessions? Concerning
the theoretical model part, will the result be changed if mobility of households and between
group comparison are allowed? These questions are left for future research.
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